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Vietnam stands at an important crossroad in its transition from a planned to market 
oriented economy.  Since the implementation of economic reform starting with Doi 
Moi in 1986, supplemented with further reform from 1989, the economy  experienced 
rapid economic growth during the period of the 1990s until 1997. Since this time 
GDP growth has noticeably slowed, partly due to the onset of the financial and 
economic crisis to afflict the region in 1997-98, and partly due to a disconcerting, and 
related, decline in foreign direct investment flows. Despite this adverse development 
there has been a remarkable transformation of the economy that has seen it become 
more globally oriented, as exemplified by a rapid growth of both exports and imports 
and with a significant contribution to the economy from the foreign invested sector. 
 
For Vietnam to once again re-establish high and sustainable rates of economic growth 
will require further restructuring and reform efforts. In particular, this will require 
further progress in: establishing the institutional framework necessary for a market 
economy; ownership reform; encouraging foreign direct investment; allowing the 
private sector a larger role in the management and ownership of currently state owned 
enterprises; allowing unviable state owned assets to be liquidated and their assets put 
to more productive usage; and encouraging fair competition between different 
ownership forms, with the state, as a buyer, not discriminating against any form of 
ownership. These should form the core of the country’s competition policy.  
 
This paper focuses upon the need for competition policy to encourage the nurturing, 
growth and development, specifically, of private sector small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs).  Private entrepreneurship and enterprise reform can play a crucial role in the 
reform of the Vietnamese economy. Establishing a dynamic non-state manufacturing 
sector, with an emphasis on SMEs, will be a precondition for attaining the twin 
objectives of (1) restructuring and slimming state enterprises and (2) expanding non-
farm employment and income opportunities. SMEs have the potential for job creation, 
contributing to sustainable economic development, allocating resources more 
efficiently, expanding exports, achieving a more equal distribution of incomes, and 
assist in rural and regional development.  
 
Paper presented at an AusAid-APEC Workshop on Anti-trust Law and Competition 
Policy, 3-4 July 2001, Ministry of Trade, Hanoi, Vietnam.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Vietnam stands at an important crossroad in its transition from a planned to market 
oriented economy. Since the implementation of economic reform starting with Doi 
Moi in 1986, supplemented with further reform from 1989, the economy experienced 
rapid economic growth during the period of the 1990s until 1997. Since this time 
GDP growth has noticeably slowed, partly due to the onset of the financial and 
economic crisis to afflict the region in 1997-98, and partly due to a disconcerting, and 
related, decline in foreign direct investment flows. Despite this adverse development 
there has been a remarkable transformation of the economy that has seen it become 
more globally oriented, as exemplified by a rapid growth of both exports and imports 
and with a significant contribution to the economy from the foreign invested sector. 
 
For Vietnam to once again re-establish high and sustainable rates of economic growth 
further restructuring and reform efforts are required. In particular, achieving further 
progress in establishing the institutional framework necessary for a market economy, 
including: the enforcement of contracts; financial discipline and a hard budget 
constraint on state owned enterprises; establishing the rule of law; and restructuring of 
the banking sector so that it operates on commercial lines. The country will also be 
required to make further progress in ownership reform, focusing upon: ensuring free 
and unrestricted entry to markets for all ownership forms, and the development of a 
start up private sector; encouraging foreign  direct investment; allowing the private 
sector a larger role in the management and ownership of currently state owned 
enterprises; allowing unviable state owned assets to be liquidated and their assets put 
to more productive usage; and encouraging fair competition between different 
ownership forms, with the state, as a buyer, not discriminating against any form of 
ownership. These should form the core of the country’s competition policy.  
 
This paper focuses upon the need for competition policy to encourage the nurturing, 
growth and development, specifically, of private sector small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs).  Private entrepreneurship and enterprise reform can play a crucial role in the 
reform of the Vietnamese economy. There is a recognition that a dynamic non-state 
manufacturing sector in particular is a precondition for attaining the twin objectives of 
(1) restructuring and slimming state enterprises and (2) expanding non-farm 
employment and income opportunities. In particular, the ability to nurture a nd 
encourage the development of SMEs is of crucial importance not only in terms of 
creating employment, but also as a means of achieving sustainable economic 
development, a more efficient allocation of resources along the lines of the country’s 
comparative advantage, that is labour intensive manufactured goods, expanded 
exports, a more equal distribution of incomes, and is essential for rural and regional 
development.  
 
It has been increasingly recognised by regional economies in the wake of the financial 
and economic crisis that there needs to be a change in emphasis for industry policy. 
Industry restructuring, with a greater focus upon the development of SMEs has 
occurred. Unless Vietnam is similarly able to restructure its economy, with an 
emphasis on the development of SMEs, it will find itself in a relatively weaker 
competitive position, vis a vis its regional neighbours, to capitalise on the recovery in 
the region as it gathers pace. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 conducts a review of Vietnam’s recent 
economic performance and the contribution of the private sector to this. Section 3 
provides a profile of Vietnam’s SMEs. Section 4 identifies strategies for the 
promotion of the SME sector and for the development of the private sector in general. 
Section 5 discusses the important role of the Government and the key areas for the 
support and promotion of SMEs. Section 6 briefly identifies the core ingredients of an 
effective competition policy. Finally, section 7 provides a summary of the major 
conclusions from this paper. 
 
2.  Vietnam’s recent economic performance and the contribution of the private 
sector 
 
2.1  Vietnam’s recent economic performance 
 
During the period of the 1990s Vietnam was one of the fastest growing economies in 
the world, achieving an annual average GDP growth rate of 7.4 percent. This 
contributed to a rapid improvement in GDP per capita (see Figure 1). During this 
period of rapid economic growth there was a noticeable change in the structure of the 
economy, with the contribution of the agriculture sector to GDP declining from 40.6 
percent in 1990 to 23.8 percent in 1999, the GDP share of the industry sector 
increasing from 22.4 percent in 1990 to 34.3 percent by 1999, and the share of the 
services sector increasing from 36.9 percent of GDP in 1990 to 41.9 percent in 1999 
(see Figure 2). Such a structural transformation is a typical and nearly universal 
feature accompanying economic development (see for example Chenery and Syrquin 
(1975)). 
 
On further analysis it can be found that this rapid rate of economic growth was led by 
the industrial sector. Table 1, taken from Belser (2000), shows that the average annual 
growth of GDP over the high growth rate period 1993-97 was an impressive 8.9 
percent. The major sector contributing to this growth was the industrial sector, where 
value added increased at an average annual rate of 13.4 percent. The services sector 
also grew impressively at 9.4 percent a year during this period, while the agriculture 
sector lagged behind with an average annual increase of 4.3 percent. This accounts for 
the share of industry and services in GDP increasing relative to that of agriculture. 
The period of the 1990s has seen a rise in the importance of both the non-state sector 
and the foreign invested sector in industrial production (see Figure 3). In 1990 the 
state sector contributed almost 68 percent of industrial production, falling to just over 
50 percent by 1995. However in 1999 there was a further decline in its contribution to 
industrial production, down to just under 44 percent. Therefore over half of industrial 
production in 1999 was from the private domestic and foreign sectors, with the 
contribution of the latter, in particular, worthy of note. 
 
The rapid growth of the industrial sector has contributed to an expansion in industrial 
employment. Cross-country evidence provided by Gillis et al. (1987) indicates that 
over the period 1965 to 1983 developing countries experienced on average a growth 
elasticity of employment in industry of around 0.6. That is, industrial employment 
expanded at around 60 percent of the rate of industrial growth. In the case of Vietnam, 
however, industrial growth has had only a moderate impact on employment. As 
indicated by Tables 2 and 3 the growth rate of industrial employment in Vietnam 
between 1992/93 to 1997/98 was 4 percent per year. While respectable, this represents  
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less than 30 percent of the rate of industrial output growth. Consequently, despite the 
rapid growth of the industrial sector the share of industrial employment in total 
employment has only increased from 11.8 percent to 13.1 percent. Interestingly, when 
construction is excluded from the Industry sector, the record is even worse. Hence a 
key issue for policy makers in Vietnam is how best to benefit in terms of employment 
growth in the context of rapid growth in the industrial sector. In this regard the 
contribution of the private sector and SMEs will be of particular importance. 
 
Table 1.  Industrialisation of Vietnam 
 
  Average annual real 
GDP growth during 
1993-97 (%) 
Estimated share in 
total output in 1992 
(%) 
Share in total output 
1997 (%) 
Total   8.9  100  100 
Agriculture  4.3  31.6  25.2 
Industry  13.4  27.3  33.1 
Industry less 
construction 
13.1  20.7  24.7 
Services  9.4  41.1  41.7 
 
Source: Belser (2000), p.2 
 
There are a number of reasons to explain this sluggish growth of employment, and 
this can be identified with the aid of Table 4. This shows that in industry the state and 
the domestic non-state sectors grew rapidly over the period 1995-98. However, it is 
clear that the state sector dominates the domestic non-state sector, more specifically 
the private sector. In 1998 the state sector’s contribution to industrial value added was 
more than twice that of the domestic private sector. State enterprises therefore 
contributed substantially to the expansion of industrial production, amounting to 37.2 
percent of Vietnam’s total industrial growth between 1995 and 1998. This compared 
to only 16.2 percent for domestic private companies. Foreign investment, however, 
was the most important single contributor to expanded industrial production.  
 
By comparison to its contribution to industrial production the state sector’s 
contribution to industrial employment is considerably less. State sector industrial 
employment was less than 25 percent of total employment in this sector. The domestic 
non-state sector, by contrast, although contributing only 22 percent of industrial 
output employed more than 64 percent of industrial workers. A large proportion of 
these workers were in household enterprises. Of particular interest is the employment 
contribution of the registered private and mixed companies. Although contributing 
only 7.9 percent of industrial GDP in 1998 they employed more workers than that of 
the SOEs. 
 
Vietnam’s slow employment growth in the industrial sector, therefore, arises from the 
state sector’s strong growth but low labour intensity, and the private sector’s still 
relatively small size. This poor employment performance can therefore be partially 
explained as a by product of the transition period to a market economy, in which the 
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Table 2.  Industrial employment growth 
 





















36.8  40.3  3.5  1.8  100 
Agriculture  26.2  26.8  0.6  0.4  16.7 




3.8  4.3  0.5  2.6  14.8 
Services  6.3  8.2  1.9  5.6  56.3 
Note: Employment data is for people between 15 and 65. 
Source: Vietnam Living Standard Survey, 1 and 2 
 
Table 3.  Employment by sector 
 
  Share in total labour 
force 
1992-93 (%) 
Share in total 
labour force 
1997-98 (%) 
% Change from  
1992-93 to 1997-98 
Agriculture  71.2  66.4  -4.7 
Industry  11.8  13.1  +1.3 
Industry and 
construction 
10.3  10.7  +0.4 
Services  17.0  20.5  +3.4 
 
Source: Vietnam Living Standard Surveys, 1 and 2. 
 
Table 4.  Contribution to industrial production and employment by sector 
 




Share in industrial 
production growth 
(%) 1995-98 
Share in industrial 
GDP (%) 1998 
Share in industrial 
employment 
1997-98 (%) 
State sector  10.2  37.2  46.2  24.2 
Foreign 
investment 
22.7  46.5  31.8  11.5 
Domestic non 
state sector 
9.2  16.2  22.0  64.3 
Of which: 
-  private and 
mixed 
-  collective 






















Sources: General Statistical Office and Vietnam Living Standard Survey, 2 
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growth of private enterprises is rapid but overall contribution is small as a result of 
starting from a much lower base. Also, state enterprises, which tend to be 
concentrated in import substituting activities and are sheltered from both foreign and 
domestic competition, typically draw capital and other resources away from the 
private sector. This could have prevented higher rates of private sector growth and 
employment, and could be of concern for the attainment of longer-term growth and 
employment creation. 
 
Another important feature of Vietnam’ development process has been the increasing 
significance of international trade. Table 5 indicates that between 1992 and 1999, for 
example, the dollar value of imports and exports more than quadrupled, increasing the 
share of trade in GDP from 52 percent to 58 percent. In 1997 the share of trade in 
GDP reached a remarkable 86 percent, a high level by international standards. Table 6 
indicates that Vietnam’s export growth was led by impressive growth in light 
manufactured exports, which in real terms grew by no less than 45 percent a year and 
whose share in total exports rose from 13.5 percent in 1992 to 36.7 percent in 1997. 
Also remarkable is the strong rise in the value of agriculture exports, mainly reflecting 
the spectacular take off in rice and coffee production. In only a few years Vietnam 
turned from being a net rice importer into the world’s second largest exporter with 
over 3.5 million tons in 1998. 
 
The performance in manufacturing exports was supported by foreign investment. 
Vietnam’s trade and taxation regimes now contain special provisions that allow export 
oriented foreign enterprises to import duty free intermediate goods from abroad and to 
enjoy preferential tax rates. In addition, many joint ventures are also exempted from 
import duties on equipment goods, machine components, spare parts and transport 
equipment and materials. Table 7 shows that the dollar value of exports by foreign 
invested companies, about 40 percent of which stem from light manufacturing, grew 
by 80 percent per year between 1994 and 1997. This raised the share of exports by 
foreign invested companies from less than 4 percent in 1994 to almost 20 percent of 
total exports in 1997. 
 
Table 5.  Exports, imports and the share of trade in GDP 
 
Year  1992  1997  1999 
Value of exports 
(million US$) 
2,581  9,185  11,500 
Value of imports 
(million US$) 
2,540  11,592  11,600 
(Exports + 
Imports)/GDP (%) 
51.6  85.7  58.0 
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Table 6.  Export growth by sector 
 
  Estimated average 
annual real growth 
1992-97 (%) 
Share in total exports in 
1992 (%) 
Share in total exports in 
1997 (%) 
Total exports  18.8  100  100 
Agriculture  11.1  49.5  35.3 
Heavy industry and 
minerals 
12.3  37.0  28.0 
Light industry 
Of which: 
-  textiles and garments 











Source: Belser (2000), p.5 
 
 
Table 7.  FDI and its contribution to exports 
 
  1994  1997 
Total exports by foreign 
companies (US$ million) 
161.1  1,790 
Total light industrial 
exports by foreign 
companies (US$ million) 
na  728 
Share of FDI in total 
exports (%) 
3.9  19.5 
Share of FDI in light 
industry exports (%) 
na  21.6 
 
Source: Belser (2000). 
 
2.2  Contribution of the private sector to the economy 
 
The Prime Minister in his opening speech to the National Assembly in November 
1999, emphasised the importance of creating a climate conducive to private sector 
development. Farmers, household micro enterprises, private SMEs and relatively 
large foreign invested enterprises comprise the private sector in Vietnam. The de-
collectivisation of agriculture, together with the approval of the Domestic and Foreign 
Investment laws in the late 1980s, as well as the Commercial Law in the early 1990s, 
were extremely effective in promoting growth of the private sector from a negligible 
base. The economic reforms of the 1980s were remarkably effective in galvanising the 
energy of millions of Vietnamese individuals who diversified and expanded their 
agricultural production rapidly, and set up many micro-household-enterprises as well 
as domestic private registered SMEs. Foreign firms invested in majority foreign 
owned joint ventures or in wholly foreign owned enterprises. Tapping the potential of 
individual farmers’ drive and dynamism through “Doi Moi”  was key to the rapid 
growth and employment generation of the 1990s (see World Bank (1999)). In the 
early part of the twenty first century, unleashing the potential of the private non-farm 
sector, to produce and to export, is likely to be the key to restoring higher growth of 
income and employment during the next decade. 
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While systematic data on the performance of the domestic private sector is limited, 
what does exist suggests a significant expansion and diversification of private sector 
activities in the  last 10 years. Five important facts about the performance of the 
private sector can be usefully highlighted. 
 
First, the share of the private sector in total GDP in 1998 was about 50 percent, see 
Table 8, approximately the same share as in 1993. Hence the domestic private sector’s 
share of GDP remained stagnant during this period. During the period 1995-98 the 
domestic private sector, despite its many constraints, grew at 9 percent a year, only a 
percentage point lower than the growth of the state owned sector. 
 
Second, less than half of manufacturing GDP in 1998 was produced by private firms, 
but the share is increasing, with the domestic private sector dominating that share (see 
Table 8). The domestic private sector, especially household enterprises, has h ad an 
important role in manufacturing. Household micro enterprises and private SMEs 
account for 28 percent of manufacturing GDP. As of 1999 there were around 600,000 
micro household enterprises in manufacturing, contributing 18 percent of 
manufacturing value added, and 5600 private SMEs in manufacturing accounting for 
10 percent of manufacturing GDP. However, with the introduction of the Enterprise 
Law in 2000 the situation was changing rapidly, especially for private registered 
SMEs, with more than 10,000 new firms registered during the first nine months of 
2000.  
 
The period of the 1990s has seen a steady decline in the contribution of the state 
sector towards industrial output, from around 62 percent in 1990 to 44 percent by 
1999 and to just over 42 percent in 2000 (see Table 9). While the domestic private 
(non-state) share has actually declined during this period the foreign invested 
enterprises’ share has increased considerably. Most of this was due to very rapid 
growth of foreign invested enterprises in the oil and gas sector as well as in 
manufacturing. Household enterprise growth stagnated after the first half of the 1990s 
as the environment for domestic private enterprises was not sufficiently favourable to 
promote their rapid growth. Thus foreign invested enterprises now have a much 
bigger share of total private industrial output than was the case in 1990.  
 
Table 8.  Private sector’s share in 1998 GDP (percent) 
 
  Total GDP  Manufacturing GDP 
State sector  49  54 
  State owned enterprises  na  na 
Private sector  51  46 
  Foreign invested sector  10  18 
  Domestic private sector  41  28 
    Of which:     
    Household  
    enterprises/farmers  
34  18 
    Private SMEs  7  10 
 
Source: General Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook. 
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Table 9.  Industrial output: growth and share by sector, 1990-2000 
 
  1990  1995  1999p  2000e 
         
Total industrial growth (%)  3.2  13.8  10.4  15.5 
         
Percent of industrial output 
       
State owned enterprises 
61.7  50.3  43.5  42.2 
Domestic private (non state) sector  
29.5  24.6  21.8  22.7 
Foreign invested 
8.8  25.1  34.7  35.2 
p – preliminary figure 
e - estimate 
Source: General Statistical Office, Yearbook. 
 
 
Third the domestic private sector is considerably more labour intensive in comparison 
to the state sector and the foreign invested sector. Referring to Table 4 again, it can be 
seen that in 1998 the state sector contributed 46 percent to industrial production but 
employed only 24 percent of the industrial workforce. The foreign invested sector 
contributed 32 percent of industrial production but employed only 11.5 percent of the 
industrial workforce. By contrast the domestic non state-sector, household enterprises 
and private SMEs, contributed only 22 percent of industrial production but employed 
64 percent of the industrial workforce. The relatively large share of the private sector 
in employment and in labour intensive exports indicates that it has been 
outperforming other enterprises in exploiting Vietnam’s comparative advantage in 
labour intensive production. Indeed, private sector development in Vietnam, through 
its effect on growth and employment, can have a significant impact on poverty 
reduction. 
 
Fourthly, private SMEs in manufacturing, especially the larger ones, are highly export 
oriented. In Vietnam there are around 457 private manufacturers with more than 100 
full time workers (see MPFD (1999)) that operate mainly in labour intensive sectors 
like garments, footwear, plastic products, seafood and so on (see Table 10). On 
average these SMEs export around three-quarters of their  production, and 
consequently have a greater export orientation than SOEs. By comparison foreign 
invested enterprises export only around a half of their output. 
 
Finally, private foreign invested enterprises are playing an increasingly important role 
in the economy, accounting for about a fifth of manufacturing output and employing 
300,000 workers in 1998. There has been a slight trend away from joint ventures with 
state enterprises and an increase in wholly foreign owned investments. A large share 
of foreign investment in industry is in the production of import competing goods in 
capital-intensive sectors. This is a reflection of the incentives offered to foreign 
investors in the form of protection to these sectors. In particular, import-licensing 
restrictions with unlimited protection have encouraged over investment for the 
domestic market, at the cost of export markets. This structure of foreign investment 
partially reflects Vietnam’s high barriers to heavy industrial imports that not only  
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protect state enterprises but also attracts foreign investors into import substituting and 
capital-intensive activities, often with SOEs. This form of foreign investment is 
generally inefficient. It creates local monopolies and raises the price of products 
relative to those that would have prevailed under free imports. Thus, although foreign 
investment has boosted local production it has done little to create employment. 
Improving the climate for export oriented foreign investors would certainly assist 
Vietnam towards more labour intensive export led growth in line with its comparative 
advantage. 
 




Number of firms 
Exports/Output (%) 
(unweighted average) 
Garments and textiles  159  80.5 
Leather products  34  85.0 
Rubber and plastic products  22  75.0 
Food and beverages (incl. seafood)  71  63.2 
Wood products  65  75.1 
Other non-metallic products  39  73.2 
Basic metals  9  na 
Chemical products  9  20.0 
Others  49  74.4 
Total  457  75.3 
 
Source: Mekong Project Development Facility (1999) 
 
The adoption of the 1987 Law on Foreign Investment and subsequent amendment 
established an “open door” policy for investors and increasingly simplified investment 
procedures. This gradual improvement in the investment climate led to a large 
increase in foreign capital inflows, mainly from Asian countries. During the period 
1993-97 the inflow of disbursed foreign investment increased by almost 46 percent 
per annum (in terms of current US dollars), reaching nearly US$2.1 billion during 
1997. Most of this foreign investment was capital intensive. Although the share of 
FDI going to light industry has increased in recent years, most investment entered oil 
related production, heavy industry or real estate. By the end of 1998 less than 13 
percent of the total stock of FDI was in the labour intensive light industrial sector, 
where about 80 percent of production is exported (according to information from the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment). This indicates that the amount of export 
oriented and labour intensive foreign investment attracted by Vietnam’s high human 
capital and low labour costs has been relatively small. It is therefore not surprising 
that foreign investment, while accounting for 31.8 percent of industrial production in 
1998, and half of industrial growth over the period 1995-98, employed only 11.5 
percent of all industry workers in 1997/98. 
 
Despite a number of favourable developments the private sector remains more 
constrained in Vietnam than in other countries in the region, including China. The 
private sector continues to face various unnecessary restrictions on entry arising from 
the remaining business license requirements, whose modification and rationalisation 
are still needed. Access to and transactions in land use rights remain difficult despite  
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recent changes in land law and security regulations. New institutional arrangements 
like registries, and procedures for selling foreclosed land use rights are not in place. 
Access to capital and credit is also more difficult for private SMEs in part because 
banks are in dire financial straits, and in part because lending to SOEs is viewed more 
favourably than lending to the private sector. But improving the climate for day to day 
operations of private investors - making interactions with the bureaucracy easier- will 
necessitate deep seated behavioural changes in the way private activity is perceived 
by the civil service, the dominant state owned commercial banks, and, most 
importantly, by the political leadership. 
  
3.  Vietnam’s SMEs - a profile 
  
The Vietnamese economy is characterised by a large number of small and medium 
sized enterprises with little capital, total SME capital accounts for just 20 percent of 
the total business capital value of all enterprises, and a small number of state-owned 
enterprises holding most of the capital of the whole country
1. More than half of all 
SMEs are not owned by the state and are therefore, officially at least, private. In 
practice many companies that appear to be private are really not. “So dominant is the 
state in Vietnam that the only way to survive is through a network of political 
patronage” (The Economist (1997), p.46). Before 1988 Vietnam had no private 
enterprises, “apart from family firms, which were politically above suspicion if only 
because, at least officially, they did not employ any wage labour” (Wolff (1999), p. 
72). There were, however, some enterprises that were run virtually along market-
economy lines, particularly in the south of the country. Currently, the most important 
organisational form of private enterprise is still the household firm, employing an 
average of 3 employees each (Wolff (1999), p.73)
2. The next largest element of what 
Wolff calls the semi-formal private sector, are the industrial co-operatives and quasi-
co-operative ‘production groups’ (Wolff (1999)). The number of non-state enterprises 
has increased dramatically recently
3 and the number of enterprises in the collective 
and state sectors has tended to decrease. The number of private enterprises, excluding 
business households or groups working below the limit of legal capital, has been 
increasing most quickly. Only 5.7 percent of non-state enterprises were established 
before 1990
4.  
3.1  The Number and Structure of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
 
In Vietnam, SMEs are officially defined by the Government as enterprises with 
chartered capital of under VND
5 5 billion (or US$360,000) and fewer than 200 staff
6. 
In 1998 there were more than 30,000 registered enterprises in Vietnam, including 
more than 23,000 non-state enterprises. Of these registered firms, approximately 
22,000 were SMEs. SMEs in Vietnam account for 87.7 percent of the number of State 
firms, 30 percent of joint ventures, and 96 percent of total private firms in Vietnam. 
(Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), (1998)). 
 
                                                                 
1 Vietnam had approximately 5300 SOEs in 2000. 
2 Ironically, the Government of Vietnam does not consider family-owned businesses to be private 
companies (Vietnam News Agency, 2000). 
3 The size of registered capital of these newly established enterprises has been decreasing. 
4 General Statistical Office, 1996. 
5 Vietnamese Dong. 
6 Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1998.  
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If we classify SMEs by their amount of investment capital (those enterprises with 
investment capital below VND 5 billion) and by their number of employees (less than 
200), then around 90 percent of the total number of enterprises in  Vietnam are 
classified as small or medium sized. Despite making up the preponderance of 
Vietnamese enterprises the capital value of these SMEs accounts for only 20 percent 
of the total business capital value of all enterprises
7. The considerable capital value of 
the SOEs, particularly the large ones, accounts for this, in addition to the fact that the 
capital value of the non-state SMEs account for only just over half (52 percent) of the 
total capital value of non-state enterprises. 
 
Figure 4 indicates the growth in number of private registered SMEs over the period 
1994-97. In 1994 there were 10,859 privately registered SMEs of which most were in 
the industry sector (4,392) and trade sector (3,894). While overall industrial growth 
has outstripped service sector growth, growth in the number of private SMEs has been 
far higher in services than industry. This reflects the bias in industrial growth in 
favour of capital intensive and large sized enterprises. Trading SMEs more than 
tripled in number between 1994 and 1997 (Figure 4)) while those in construction and 
other services more than doubled. The faster growth of service SMEs is largely 
because this sector is less dominated by state enterprises and thus experiences fewer 
restrictions on private participation. In 1997 56.5 percent of all SMEs were in trade 
and repairing services; 21.2 percent were in the industry sector; 6.9 percent were in 
the construction sector; and the remaining 15.3 percent in other services. Most (90 
percent) of the more than 5,122 SME firms in industry in 1997 were in four sub-
sectors: food and beverages (56 percent); garments and shoes (9 percent); metals and 
metal products (17 percent) and wood and paper products (11 percent). SMEs are 
typically well represented in sectors in which size and scale are not significant cost 
advantages. Such activities offer the greatest potential for future expansion of private 
SMEs (World Bank. 1998, p. 30).  
 
The contribution of non-state SMEs under a number of categories for various 
economic sectors in 1997 is contained in Table 11 and that for the economy as a 
whole in Table 12. 
 
Table 11 
Contribution of Non-State SMEs in the main economic sectors 1997 (%) 
 
Sector  Capital  Labour  Turnover  Tax payments 
Fisheries  55  80  57  87 
Processing industry  15  49  22  24 
Construction  22  56  33  19 
Trade  21  60  42  18 
Service & hospitality  19  56  43  63 
 









                                                                 
7 General Statistical Office, 1996.  
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Table 12 
Contribution of Non-State SMEs in the economy, 1998 (%) 
 
Capital  Labour   Turnover  Tax payments 
10.2  47  35  16 
 
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1999 
 
3.2  Contribution to GDP and production 
 
In Vietnam there are almost no figures available for the contribution of SMEs to the 
economy. The following is an attempt to draw a general picture of the sector based on 
data available for economic inputs. In 1995 the share of “value added” produced by 
the non-state sector to GDP was 65 percent. The contribution of non-state enterprises, 
including SMEs, to GDP was approximately 36.6 percent. The share of capital value 
of SMEs in the total business capital value of all non-state enterprises was 
approximately 52 percent
8. It is therefore possible to assume that the proportion that 
SMEs provided of the total value added produced by non-state enterprises was also 52 
percent, that is 19 percent of GDP.  The share of value added produced by SOEs as a 
whole is equal to 25 percent of GDP
9. Assuming that the value added by state SMEs 
is equal to one fifth of this then the contribution of state SMEs to value added is equal 
to approximately 5 percent of GDP. Thus, the share of value added produced by all 
SMEs in the country, in all economic sectors, is estimated to be approximately equal 
to 24 percent of GDP (see Table 13). This corresponds with the figure of 25 percent of 
GDP quoted by the World Bank (2001) p.49, suggesting that the proportion of GDP 
contributed by all SMEs has not changed by much during the latter half of the 1990s. 
 
Table 13 
Contribution of Vietnamese SMEs to GDP 1995 
 
No.  Vietnamese SMEs by Ownership  Percentage of GDP 
1  Non-state SMEs  19 % 
2  State-owned SMEs  5 % 
TOTAL   24 % 
 
Sources: Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1998 
 
Tables 4 and 9 indicate that the state sector dominated the industrial sector during the 
period of the 1990s. However by 2000 its contribution had fallen to 42 percent of 
industrial production, and foreign invested enterprises, including joint ventures with 
SOEs, contributed a further 35 percent of industrial production. The domestic non-
state sector contributed the remaining 23 percent of industrial production, with the 
bulk of this being produced by household micro-enterprises. While private registered 
companies (SMEs), overall, contributed a very small proportion of industrial output, 
only about 2.4 percent of industrial production in 1997 (Table 14), they were very 
important in the production of key export items including that of garments and 
textiles. However, the share contributed by all SMEs (including state SMEs, private 
local SMEs and those with foreign investment) to the total industrial gross output has 
been estimated by one source to be equal to 31 percent
10. However, compared with 
                                                                 
8 Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1998. 
9 General Statistical Office, 1998. 
10 Central Institute for Economic Management, 1998.  
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other countries in the region, where SMEs contribute on average 50-60 percent of 
GDP
11, the performance of Vietnamese SMEs remains modest.  
 
Table 14 
Distribution of Industrial Output by Ownership (%), 1997 Figures 
 
  Total Industry  Garments  Textiles 
State Owned Enterprises  51.4  36.0  60.0 
Foreign Invested Enterprises¹  24.4  15.0  16.0 
Non-State  24.2  49.0  24.0 
                                     Of which: 








Note:  ¹ Includes 100 percent foreign-owned companies and joint ventures with SOEs  
  ² Private registered enterprises and others not in partnership with SOEs  
Source: World Bank (1998), Table 2.4, p. 30. 
 
3.5  Contribution to industrial employment  
 
The non-state sector contributes significantly to employment. As indicated in Table 4 
the non-state sector contributed 76 percent of industrial employment in 1997-98, with 
the domestic private sector contributing 64 per cent of total industrial employment. 
Private SMEs contributed 27 percent and household enterprises contributed 37 
percent of total industrial employment in 1997/98 (see Table 15). The World Bank 
((2001), p. 49) has asserted that total SMEs for all sectors contribute 50 percent of 
total labour employment. 
 
Table 15 
Industrial employment by sector (%), 1997-98 
 
Ownership  % of workforce 
State sector  24 
Foreign invested  12 
Private SMEs  27 
Household enterprises  37 
 
Sources: GSO: Vietnam Living Standard Survey 2, 1999 
  
3.6  Contribution to international trade 
 
As identified previously, Vietnam has made considerable advances in increasing the 
openness of its economy. Between 1991 and 1995 private firms were allowed to 
engage in foreign trade by obtaining a license, tariff exemptions were introduced for 
imported inputs used in the production of exports, licensing procedures were 
simplified, an inter bank foreign exchange market was introduced, and quotas on 
exports were removed except for rice. Vietnam signalled its intention to integrate with 
the region by joining ASEAN in 1995, and is now also seeking membership of the 
WTO. Since 1998 the trade regime has been opened up further. The most significant 
measure was the freeing up of trading rights for firms registered in Vietnam. These 
firms were allowed, for the first time, to export and import goods directly without a 
license
12. This newly provided right for domestic firms encouraged significant 
                                                                 
11 Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1999. 
12 For imports: registered domestic firms could only import products that were specified in their  
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participation of private firms in foreign trade. Domestic private SMEs' share of non 
oil exports rose from 12 percent in 1997 to 22 percent in mid 2000, Their share of 
imports increased from 4 percent to 16 percent over the same period (see Table 16). 
There is therefore considerable potential for an expansion of exports by SMEs, 
particularly given that they primarily produce labour intensive products that are in line 
with the country’s comparative advantage. 
 
Table 16  Shares in non oil exports and total imports 
 
              Non oil                exports  Total  Imports 
  1997  Mid-2000  1997  Mid-2000 
State owned enterprises  65  46  68  57 
Foreign invested 
enterprises 
23  32  28  27 
Domestic private SMEs  12  22  4  16 
Total  100  100  100  100 
 
Source: Ministry of Trade 
 
3.7  Distribution of SMEs by location 
 
According to Ministry of Planning and Investment calculations, see Table 17, more 
than 55 percent of the total number of SMEs are located in the Southeast and the 
Mekong River Delta. The figures for the Red River Delta and the North Central Coast 
are 18.1 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively. This suggests that there is 
considerable scope for an expansion of SMEs in the north of the country, where in the 
past SOEs have traditionally dominated. 
 
Table 17 
Distribution of SMEs by Region 
 
Region  Percentage 
1  Southeast Coast & Mekong River Delta  55.0% 
2  Red River Delta  18.1% 
3  North Central Coast  10.1% 
4  Other Regions  16.8% 
TOTAL   100.0% 
 
Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment, 1998 
 
4.  SME promotion and private sector development 
 
4.1  Overview 
 
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam has drafted a Socio-
Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) 2001-2010 that is “aimed at accelerating 
industrialisation and modernisation in the socialist orientation and creating a 
foundation  for Vietnam to become an industrialised country by 2020”
13. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
registration license, and foreign invested firms could not do so until the recent revision to the Foreign 
Investment Law had eased those restrictions somewhat. 
13 Central Committee of the Communist Party “Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2001-2010 
(draft) p.1.  
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envisages that GDP will double from 2000 to 2010
14. Vietnam in 2000 faced serious 
challenges in employment generation with unemployment figures at more than 7 
percent, underemployment around 30 percent and an expected growth of the 
workforce of 11 million people over the next 10 years. Since unemployment and 
underemployment are the major factors contributing to poverty, the creation of new 
jobs, and particularly in the rural sector, will be crucial for the reduction of poverty.  
 
To accomplish these aims the SEDS gives particular emphasis to SMEs and private 
enterprises, especially given their ability to generate employment and opportunities 
for the poor. In 2000 overall SMEs, both state and private, generated approximately a 
quarter of GDP, employed around 50 percent of the Vietnamese labour force and were 
the fastest growing type of enterprise in terms of numbers (see World Bank (2001), p. 
49). A flourishing private sector and a growing number of SMEs have the potential to: 
generate new jobs as well as absorb labour made redundant by the ongoing reform of 
the SOEs; provide the engine for economic growth; contribute to export growth; and 
play a vital role in the modernisation and industrialisation of Vietnam. Therefore the 
government realises that it will be essential, to achieve the targets set under the SEDS, 
to support the further development of the private sector and SMEs. 
 
Meeting the draft strategy’s investment targets will require total domestic private 
investment having to rise to 11-13 percent of GDP. This is unlikely to occur without a 
significant improvement in the climate for the private sector, and for SMEs in 
particular. The climate for the private sector, however, still remains grudging rather 
than supportive. This contrasts markedly with China where the private sector has been 
recognised openly as a key partner in the country’s development
15. Despite this there 
are indications that the climate is improving. In mid 1998 the Law on Promotion of 
Domestic Investment was revised providing new incentives for the domestic private 
sector. This was followed by the approval and implementation of the Enterprise Law 
in 1999 and 2000. Together with the elimination of more than 100 different business 
licenses that restricted entry in different sectors, ongoing implementation of the Law 
is improving the policy environment for domestic private SMEs significantly. The 
Enterprise Law 2000 substantially simplified business start up and led to the 
registration of more than 10,000 additional domestic firms in the first nine months of 
2000. However, domestic private registered firms (private SMEs) still number only 
around 30,000 and produce less than 10 percent of GDP. Creating a level playing field 
for the private sector will require a shift in the social and administrative culture from 
one of reluctance and control towards one of active support and encouragement. The 
private sector will also benefit from the introduction of a transparent and predictable 
regulatory framework, where discretionary actions on the part of officials are 
minimised. 
 
In addition three recent government policies have gone some way to reducing the 
restrictions on private SMEs. First, firms are allowed to export directly. This will help 
small firms most of all as they were least able to bear the additional transactions costs 
of previous restrictions. Second, requirements to import through state enterprises, to 
satisfy stipulated conditions of capital and qualified personnel needed for being 
registered as an importer, have been removed. Third, foreign investors are now 
                                                                 
14 Central Committee of the Communist Party “Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2001-2010 
(draft) p.6. 
15 See for example Harvie (2001).  
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allowed to own thirty percent of shares in existing domestic enterprises, permitting 
private firms to seek foreign partners. 
 
More needs to be done in the area of finance and access to credit for SMEs, 
particularly for efficient enterprises in rural industry. So far, farmers, SOEs and 
private foreign firms have driven growth. Private small and medium enterprises have 
played a negligible role, especially in industry. But private SMEs have been the most 
efficient users of resources in other countries of the region and key to employment 
creation. They need to be encouraged in Vietnam. A vigorous private SME sector will 
need more freedom to operate and better services from a vigorous and modern 
banking sector, neither of which Vietnam has at present. A precondition for 
promoting such entrepreneurship will be to introduce reforms to reorient the country’s 
banks towards the needs of private SMEs and to restructure, equitise and liquidate 
SOEs, to improve their efficiency. A more open trade regime and less import 
protection for heavy industry will mean more investment in labour intensive sectors 
and exports (garments, footwear, travel goods, processed agricultural products, 
tourism), stimulating rural industry and agriculture. While registered private firms can 
export or import more easily, registration of private businesses, a prerequisite for 
trading, still remains difficult. 
 
The most cost effective prospect for generating off farm employment is through 
promoting SMEs (i.e. registered private companies with 50-300 employees) Each job 
generated in an SME is estimated to require a capital investment of about US$800 
(VND 11 million, in book value). In contrast, one job created in an SOE requires 
approximately US$18,000 (VND 240 million). Empirical evidence from other 




During the early period of reform in the late 1980s agricultural growth, made possible 
by allowing farmers greater decision making freedom, was the main engine for 
Vietnam’s initial surge of growth. Eliminating the existing restrictions on SMEs has 
the potential to result in a second round of growth by boosting labour intensive 
manufactures and processed agricultural exports, thereby protecting rural areas from 
the current slowdown. So far private SMEs (i.e. registered corporate firms) have 
played a minor role in industrial production, contributing only two percent of 
industrial output, and have grown very slowly. Household enterprises play a much 
larger role. This contrasts sharply with the experiences of its rapidly developing 
regional neighbours. 
  
4.2  Promoting Vietnam’s SMEs 
 
Despite an improvement in the private sector business environment its growth and 
development still remains more constrained in Vietnam than in other countries of the 
region, including China. For example, the private sector continues to face various 
unnecessary restrictions on entry arising from remaining business license 
requirements, whose modification and rationalisation are still needed. Access to and 
transactions in land use rights remain difficult despite changes in land law and 
security regulations. New institutional arrangements like registries, and procedures for 
selling foreclosed land use rights are not in place. Access to capital and credit is also 
                                                                 
16 See World Bank (1998), pp 29-30).  
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more difficult for private SMEs in part because banks are in dire financial straits and 
in part because lending to SOEs is viewed more favourably than lending to the private 
sector. But improving the climate for day-to-day operations of private investors by 
making interactions with the bureaucracy easier, will necessitate deep-seated 
behavioural changes in the way private activity is perceived by the civil service, the 
dominant state owned commercial banks, and, most importantly, by the political 
leadership. 
  
According to a recent survey by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(VCCI (1999)), the main difficulties encountered by SMEs in Vietnam are: 
 
•  The majority (80 percent) lack capital for production and trade. 
•  Most have obsolete equipment and machinery. 
•  They lack adequate physical and human resources. 
•  They lack current information on technical, market and legal issues. 
•  They lack support from the s tate, especially in technology transfer, credit 
guarantees and loans. 
  
In this section four of these issues are given particular focus: access to finance; access 
to technology and use of information technology; access to market information; and 
human capital deficiencies. Each of these is now briefly discussed in turn. 
 
4.2.1  Access to finance 
 
Government policies on mobilising financial resources have been implemented 
through taxation, interest-rate management, and investment promotion strategies. 
Domestic production did develop rapidly in the first half of the 1990s as did domestic 
savings and gross investments. From 1991-1995 domestic private investment (mainly 
by SMEs) accounted for 30 percent of total gross investment (approximately equal to 
US$6 billion). The remainder of the capital for enterprises was mobilised from formal 
domestic and international institutions. 
 
Despite the increase in investment nearly all (80 percent) of Vietnamese SMEs lack 
capital for production or business, according to official statistics (Ministry of Planning 
and Investment, (1999)). According to a survey of SMEs conducted in 1999 by the 
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI): 55 percent of enterprises had 
difficulty in obtaining capital; 67.5 percent of enterprises had to borrow from relatives 
and friends; 25 percent of enterprises had to deliver materials in advance; only 42.5 
percent of enterprises borrowed from the banks; and 20 percent of enterprises 
borrowed from other financial organisations (VCCI (1999)). 
 
Other surveys of SMEs by government management agencies and other organisations 
give similar results. These surveys also pointed out that the share of bank loans 
allocated to the non-state enterprises has tended to increase, but not in accord with 
their number and their contribution to GDP. For instance, bank loans to these 
enterprises, as a proportion of total loans, were: 10.3 percent in 1990, 18.2 percent in 
1992, 33.1 percent in 1993, and 37.1 percent in 1994 and 50 percent in 1995
17. 
However, this has not satisfied the demand for credit by non-state enterprises. The 
                                                                 
17 Sources: State Bank of Vietnam, Ministry of Finance, Central Institute of Economic Management.  
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financial system can satisfy only 25.6 percent of the credit demand by the non-state 
enterprises. According to CIEM, in 1995, among 407 SMEs surveyed, 316 had to 
borrow from informal financial sources. 
 
Difficulty in accessing financial resources by SMEs has partly resulted from the 
obstacles created by some of the policies and regulations on capital mobilisation. The 
effect of these policies has been as follows. First, the majority of external resources, 
such as Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance, have been 
allocated to the state sector.  Second, there are still irrational regulations that seriously 
hamper the capital mobilisation of SMEs. For example, the regulations on short-term 
credit issued by the State Bank give preferential treatment to the state-owned 
enterprises, which enjoy cheaper financing in comparison to their counterparts in the 
private sector. Compulsory insurance is also unreasonably required for those assets 
financed by bank loans, even when such loans had not yet been given by the banks 
and when the ownership documents related to the assets are not available. Collateral 
for bank loans is required for non-state enterprises while it is not for SOEs. There is 
still no guidance document available on collateral procedures. According to Decision 
198/NH on 16 September 1994 by the State Bank and Decision 217 on 17 August 
1996, the maximum bank loan is defined to be equal to 70 percent of the value of the 
collateral written in the loan contract. However, in practice, enterprises are given 
loans equal to less than 50 percent of collateral, regardless of the fact that the asset 
values determined by the banks are usually different from the actual values. Third, 
there are no special financial institutions for SMEs, except for a number of foreign 
funds such as the SME Development Fund, which operates through the existing 
commercial banks, and the Mekong Project Development Facility (MPDF) that 
mainly provides technical assistance for private sector SMEs. 
 
4.2.2  Access to technology and use of information technology 
 
Technology and equipment in SMEs 
 
A draft development strategy for SMEs prepared by the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI, 1999) indicated that their technology level, as well as the nature of 
their equipment and machinery, was in poor shape. Moreover, the rate of renovation is 
too low, approximately at the level of 10 percent of annual investment. The strategy 
document proposed, in order to improve conditions for the development of 
technology, that: 
 
•  Competition should be created to encourage enterprises to adopt new technology 
and renovate existing technology; 
•  The economy should be open to access and exchange information;  
•  Enterprises should be encouraged to improve their capacity to apply new 
technology. 
 
Presently, the majority of Vietnamese enterprises, especially SMEs, are using obsolete 
technology that is perhaps 3 or 4 generations behind the world's average level. Their 
technological and technical capacity is limited, and the capital level per employee is 
low (only 3 percent of the level in the large industrial enterprises)
18. 
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In a recent survey by the Central Institute for Economic Management, specialists in 
government organisations and other SME support institutions recognised that the 
technology level in SMEs is obsolete, that technology management skills are poor, 
and that product quality is low. At the same time the government has not provided 
supporting policies for technological advance. Among 40 enterprises surveyed only 2 
had been able to get any technological support
19. Policies that support the 
enhancement of technology for SMEs have many weaknesses. These are: 
 
•  There are no policies specific to SMEs (that is specific policies on training and 
improving the skills in management, technology, etc.). 
•  No research and development organisation has been created specifically for 
SMEs. 
•  The specialised organisations in science, technology, and training that exist are not 
strong enough to provide the s upporting and consulting services required for 
SMEs; 
•  The existing promotion centres were established mainly to meet the requirements 
of international assistance projects rather than to satisfy the need to support SMEs. 
•  There is still no master plan or national strategy for the development of SMEs in 
the country. 
 
Access to information technology - electronic commerce 
 
Electronic commerce has yet to be systematically developed in Vietnam. In the 
country as a whole there are only four Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and fewer 
than 100 companies with their own registered websites. The Internet is still a luxury to 
most people, with high service charges (2 US cents for each minute on-line) and 
extremely limited banking infrastructure support for e-commerce. 
 
As in many other countries e-commerce could play a vital role in Vietnam in the 
future. Currently however, especially in rural areas, lack of proper 
telecommunications, hardware and software, training, human skills and access to 
appropriate technology constitute major obstacles to the development of e-commerce 
especially for SMEs. Today only 72,000 Internet connections are registered in 
Vietnam. Major effort is required by the government to improve the current situation. 
 
4.2.3  Availability of Information 
 
One of the first steps in entering the export business is to get adequate and reliable 
information on market opportunities. This is a major difficulty for many SMEs. Most 
obtain information through the media or by personal contacts and not through formal 
channels. These personal contacts could be relatives or friends living overseas, or 
acquaintances made at trade fairs, conferences or on private trips. Only the more 
dynamic SMEs tend to contact formal organisations like the SME Club, the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry and the various Trade Associations for such information. 
However, the average SME can neither digest nor effectively use the large quantity of 
statistical data and general information from the above sources, even if they manage 
to obtain it. The lack of reliable and useful market information often leads to a 
situation where local firms export their products with lower prices than the 
competition or miss out on good business opportunities. 
                                                                 
19 Central Institute for Economic Management, 1998.  
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The availability of specific information regarding new technology has been improved 
with the opening of technology centres such as the Technology Presentation House 
(TPH) in Ho Chi Minh City. These centres have been established with the aim of 
introducing new technologies and advanced products - both local and international - 
that can be implemented in Vietnam. 
 
4.2.4  Human capital - Skills and Qualifications  
 
The skills of employees in SMEs do not meet desirable standards according to the 
Vietnamese government, because the majority of them, especially in small businesses, 
have not received any training while their educational level is low. Only about 5 
percent
20 of employees in the non-state sector have a university degree. The majority 
of the owners of non-state enterprises established in recent years have also not 
received any training, but they have a higher level of general education. Nevertheless, 
only 31.2 percent of the owners of non-state enterprises have a university or higher 
degree
21, and 51.8 percent of proprietors have a management qualification. T he 
percentage in proprietorships that have no management qualifications is 70.5 percent 
and in limited liability companies 26.4 percent. 
 
5.  Government’s role and support for SMEs 
  
5.1  Background 
 
Until the beginning of the 1980s in Vietnam there were only two significant 
institutional forms in the economy: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and co-operatives. 
Private production and business units were allowed to operate but their scale and 
scope were negligible. Economic management during this period was based on the 
mechanisms of central planning. Enterprises did not have any autonomy in their 
production and business process since the government controlled and distributed 
resources and applied a monopoly policy on trade.  
 
Economic reform started in 1986, but by 1988 inflation was increasing at an annual 
rate of 40 percent with a large current account deficit. The events of 1989 convinced 
the Vietnamese Government that it would get no further help from its previous 
benefactor, the Soviet Union. Starting in that year it therefore adopted a package of 
measures introducing strict structural reforms and macroeconomic stabilisation, in 
line with IMF orthodoxy (Reidel and Comer (1997), pp. 195-197). The “shock 
therapy” included the adoption of a policy of trade liberalisation and switching the 
economy to a market price mechanism that accelerated reform. The abolition of the 
majority of subsidies helped, and indeed forced, enterprises to operate within the 
market mechanism. The shift to a market focus was a key element in the policy of 
economic reform and contributed substantially to the development of the private 
sector in Vietnam. The policy of creating a market economy through the liberalisation 
of business activities relied on two factors: that market forces determine production 
and business decisions, and that the valid rights of enterprises are protected by the 
state (Woo (1997)).  One of the essential components of economic reform is defined 
in the policy for multi-sectoral development that recognises the permanent existence 
                                                                 
20 General Statistical Office, 1996, p.97. 
21 General Statistical Office, 1996.  
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of a variety of forms of enterprise and provides for their equal treatment under the 
law.  
 
5.2  Government’s long-term vision 
 
The draft Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) 2001 – 2010 of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of V ietnam (SEDS), emphasises accelerating 
industrialisation and modernisation of the country and creating a foundation for 
Vietnam to become an industrialised country by 2020. In order to accomplish these 
aims the SEDS emphasises the importance of SMEs and private enterprises. A 
flourishing private sector and a growing number of SMEs would: absorb new workers 
as well as labour made redundant by the ongoing reform of the SOEs; be a key engine 
of economic growth; contribute to export growth; and play a vital role in the 
modernisation and industrialisation of Vietnam. The role of the government in 
supporting the further development of the private sector and SMEs will be essential, 
and involve leveling the playing field between SOEs and private companies and 
enhancing the business environment by: ￿  simplifying the tax system; streamlining 
administrative procedures; ￿ reducing red-tape and corruption;  ￿restructuring the banking 
system; ￿and strengthening existing or, when necessary, creating additional support 
institutions. Particular focus is required for the development of SMEs in the rural 
sector where non-agricultural jobs are scarce, underemployment is high, and poverty 
widespread. 
  
5.3  Achieving the long term vision 
 
Since the change to the Constitution in 1992,  recognising the right of freedom of 
business and equality before the law for all sectors of economy, the government has 
taken steps to develop the private sector and SMEs. Most recently the SEDS, the 
PSPAP
22 and a draft Governmental Decree on SME Promotion  Policies Structure 
provide details of Government plans for further action in this area. These plans focus 
upon the following areas: enhancing the legal environment for SMEs; strengthening 
existing and/or establishing new institutions; easier access to capital; trade promotion 
and export development of SME/private enterprises; and improving the image of the 
private sector. These are now discussed in turn. 
 
5.3.1  Enhancing the legal environment for SMEs 
 
Since 1986 important achievements have been made in adopting and elaborating legal 
measures and in creating the legal framework within which all types of enterprises can 
operate. Up to the end of 1996, 55 laws (codes, laws and acts), 64 decrees and 251 
resolutions had been promulgated
23.
  However, the soundness and validity of the 
fundamental reform legislation is in doubt. Significant problems are being caused by 
the proliferation of legal instruments, many contradictory, which are issued at every 
hierarchical level. This is due partly to a lack of experience in constructing the legal 
framework and partly because of the nature of the culture and social structure and the 
tensions within it. This results in an inability of the state to make any one entity 
                                                                 
22 Private Sector Promotion Action Plan (PSPAP) agreed between Vietnam and Japan in 1999. Also 
called the Miyazawa Plan. 
23 Malesky et al. ((1998), pp.10-15, 73-4) provide an excellent summary of the nature and significance 
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accountable. The effect of which is a proliferation of state agencies with overlapping 
responsibilities and opposing functions (Kornai (1990)).  
 
Although the legal system is still not complete and has many imperfections, it has 
provided a level of protection higher than before that has helped the economy to 
operate on a legal basis. However, overall reforms have been slow and moderate and 
have often been accompanied by arbitrary new rules. A government agency (Central 
Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) (1998)) identified the following main 
shortcomings: 
 
•  Legal regulations are too complex, ambiguous and contradictory. 
•  The legal environment for different types of enterprises is different and creates 
unequal grounds for enterprises to be established and operated. Many policies give 
priority to enterprises based on their ownership without supporting measures 
being linked to the scale of enterprise (so small enterprises which are officially or 
semi-officially owned receive more protection than larger ones which are not); 
•  Frequent changes in the regulations provide an unstable legal environment; 
•  Legal instruments are usually issued hastily, without corresponding support from 
supporting legislation; 
•  Some legal documents still lack a rational basis that causes difficulties and 
restrictions for enterprises, and creates gaps which they can abuse; 
•  Communication of the nature and implications of legal changes is still limited, and 
generally enterprises, especially SMEs, have limited knowledge of the regulations.  
 
To advance the development of SMEs Vietnam requires a rule-of-law-based 
regulatory framework. The current system of vague and frequently changing 
regulations and excessive bureaucracy has resulted in: increased risk and cost of doing 
business; a drain on the resources and time of private entrepreneurs that would 
otherwise be available for investment or for management of the business; and has 
created an inhospitable business environment. Evidence from other countries shows 
that bureaucratic stranglehold, exercised through bureaucratic discretion, has been a 
major drag on private sector dynamism. To establish the rule of law as the basis for 
government-business relationships there will also be a need for institution-building. 
 
A transparent legal and regulatory framework for the private sector, therefore, needs 
to be established, to ensure a level playing field for both SOEs and the private sector. 
Three actions over the medium-term will be required to achieve this. First, 
Government should continue to monitor carefully and implement effectively the 
Enterprise Law (e.g. eliminating, modifying and rationalising the remaining business 
licenses in other sectors) and the Domestic Investment law, since they are the key 
instruments for facilitating Vietnamese private entry further. In January 2000 the new 
Enterprise Law  came into effect
24, permitting for the first time non-discretionary 
registration of private firms, instead of by Government approval, thereby eliminating 
bureaucratic steps. It also regulates the approval of establishment of a new business, 
which has to be decided within 15 days of the submission of the application. While 
this is a very important development, its implementation and enforcement is not yet 
consistent. Even though the Government has abolished many licensing requirements a 
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large number of licenses still need to be obtained, depending on the field of business. 
The momentum for the elimination of unnecessary licenses needs to be maintained.   
 
The Government has announced its intention to promulgate a Decree on SME 
Promotion Policies Structure in order to demonstrate a commitment to SME 
promotion and its strategy for achieving this. This will provide guidelines on support 
measures for private enterprises and SMEs covering areas such as encouragement 
policies and the set-up of support institutions. The Decree, originally planned to be 
promulgated in 2000, requires promulgation as soon as possible. The government also 
recognises the need to encourage the establishment of new SMEs, and to this end 
make administrative procedures simpler and more transparent. The problem 
concerning bureaucracy and complicated procedures in holding back the development 
of SMEs is acknowledged in the SEDS
25. 
 
Second, the revised Foreign Investment Law and Decision 24 need to be implemented 
in the spirit in which they were developed. Foreign investors should be encouraged, 
not discouraged, from engaging in joint-ventures with private Vietnamese firms, to 
facilitate transfer of technology, and enhance marketing contacts and management 
expertise. Third, there is a need to make the regulatory framework for private 
participation in infrastructure more transparent and predictable over the medium-term 
and conclude some of the build-operate-transfer (BOT) transactions in the power 
sector in the short-term. More generally, as recommended in the SEDS, 
implementation of equal terms for all enterprises regardless of ownership should be 
carried out as soon as possible in all relevant fields, e.g. related to bidding for 
Government procurement, access to land and credit etc. 
 
In addition, it will be important to improve the situation concerning land use rights: 
Unclear and cumbersome procedures make it very difficult for private SMEs to 
acquire land. This presents a major obstacle since access to land use rights is essential, 
especially to private enterprises, as collateral for accessing credit. In order to improve 
access to land the following steps are necessary: i) clarify and speed up procedures for 
land title allocation; ii) unify and modernise registers for land and buildings; iii) 
reduce heavy fees and taxes on registration; iv) provide clear, simple and fair 
procedures for resolving disputes. 
 
5.3.2  Strengthening of existing and/or establishment of new relevant institutions and 
changing social and administrative attitudes 
 
Ministries and agencies involved in industry, planning, education and training, such as 
the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Planning and Investment, and universities, are 
still geared towards support of the SOEs. These organisations will be required to 
should shift their focus towards the private sector and SMEs in order to enhance the 
general economic environment. This will require a fundamental change in social and 
administrative attitudes and a focusing upon an improvement in the image of the 
private sector in the country. T he vital role of private companies for employment 
generation and modernisation of Vietnam should be acknowledged and disseminated 
through the media and the educational system at all levels. Given the many years of 
discrimination against private enterprises and private entrepreneurs, stronger and 
                                                                 
25  Central Committee of the Communist Party “Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2001-2010” 
(draft) p. 30.  
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more frequent endorsement of private business by the Vietnamese leadership is 
required as was the case in China. Regular public exhortations by top leaders of the 
Party and Government to the bureaucracy to provide support to private enterprises 
under the law, would be extremely helpful. Stories in the media of domestic private 
business successes and visits by top leaders to successful private exporters would help 
to reinforce the value of private business in Vietnam’s development. 
  
Apart from access to capital most SME entrepreneurs consider lack of access to 
technical and market information, lack of skilled labour and know-how as their main 
business obstacles. The government needs to implement measures that will strengthen 
the business environment for SMEs through enhancing the performance of existing 
organisations and/or establishing relevant new organisations where appropriate. 
Measures agreed upon but still not implemented include the establishment of a 
national SME Agency that will co-ordinate consistent SME development. At the 
national level a Council for Private Sector Promotion has been proposed to provide a 
forum for a regular dialogue between relevant parties such as Government agencies, 
local authorities, business organisations/associations and representatives of the private 
sector and SMEs. It will also provide advice on private sector and SME 
encouragement policies and programs. 
 
Given the importance of mechanical engineering for the industrialisation and 
modernisation of Vietnam as well as the enhancement of technical know-how of 
entrepreneurs, the Government decided to establish three Technical Assistance 
Centres  (TACs) (in North, Central and South Vietnam). The TACs not only 
concentrate on the enhancement of technical know-how but also support industrial 
sub-sectors such as textiles, ceramics, rubber/plastics, food processing and craft 
products, by providing engineering experts with experience in specific areas required 
by SMEs. 
 
Providing an information s ystem containing data on the latest developments for 
private enterprises through an Information Centre for Private Enterprises would 
benefit private enterprises. At the provincial and local level the authorities should be 
encouraged to incorporate the private sector and SME promotion into their local 
development plans. In addition appropriate institutions on the provincial and local 
level should be established or strengthened in order to support private business 
activities. 
 
Measures that include a strengthened provision of Business Development Services 
(BDS) to assist the private sector and SMEs improve their access to resources, 
markets, new technologies, qualified labour would be beneficial. International 
experience shows that a growing number of private companies are the most flexible 
and effective providers of BDS to the diverse and fast changing demands of the 
private sector. A number of public organisations, including business associations, 
already exist in Vietnam providing these services and they should be part of the future 
support to the BDS market as well. Since many SMEs are not aware of the existence 
of, and benefits from, BDS and/or are unable to pay market rates, the development of 




In many countries business associations are playing a crucial role in identifying and 
advocating the needs and demands of the business community and in establishing a 
policy dialogue between the business community and relevant authorities. This has 
been acknowledged by the New Enterprise Law, which regulates, and the draft Decree 
on SME Promotion Policies Structure, which supports, the establishment and 
operation of private business associations. 
  
5.3.3  Easier access to capital 
 
A major constraint facing private SMEs in Vietnam is a shortage of funds. Private 
SMEs lack access to long-term loans, an equity financing system, and access to 
collateral. The strict collateral requirement by banks and the low incentives for State 
Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) to lend to SMEs, and on the other hand the 
unwillingness of private SMEs to deal with SOCBs, are serious constraints. This 
generates a vicious circle that prevents many SMEs from entering the formal credit 
sector, and forces them to rely on informal credit. Financial policies have an important 
impact on capital mobilisation and development of enterprises. Vietnam’s banking 
reforms aim to address the shortages and problems of availability of credit and capital 
for the economy. However, the impact of these reforms on the domestic private sector 
will continue to remain limited if the private sector continues to experience 
difficulties in securing access to land use rights, their potentially most valuable source 
of collateral. 
  
The Private Sector Promotion Action Plan (PSPAP), the so called Miyazawa Plan, 
agreed between Japan and Vietnam in 1999, includes more than 40 measures to 
diminish the constraints faced upon the growth of the private sector. It is based on 
three common principles: defining Government policy to promote the private sector;  
securing equal treatment for private enterprises vis-à-vis SOEs; and granting private 
enterprises freedom to conduct business within the laws of Vietnam. A number of 
these include measures to improve the financial environment of SMEs. Some of these 
have already been implemented such as: the promulgation of the Decree on the 
Lending Guarantee;  the Circular related to the Auction System;  the Decree 
Liberalising Transactions involving Land Use Rights in 1999; and the establishment 
of the Stock Exchange Centre in 2000. 
 
Others key steps to achieve further improvement in the financial environment for 
SMEs are the creation of a Two-step Loan Fund and a Credit Guarantee Fund. An 
agreement for a Two-step Loan Fund was signed between the Japan Bank for 
International Co-operation (JBIC) and the Government of Vietnam in 1999. It intends 
to provide long-term credit to SMEs through selected participating financial 
institutions (PFI), including joint stock c ommercial banks. It is expected that 70 
percent of the beneficiaries from this fund will be private SMEs. The Credit 
Guarantee Fund for SMEs aims to further encourage financial institutions to lend to 
SMEs by absorbing a part of the credit risk, thereby alleviating current borrowing 
constraints as a result of their insufficient collateral capacity. 
 
Other measures proposed include further improvement of the regulatory framework 
on lending, mortgaging, and leasing, and the pending banking sector reform will also 
provide SMEs with better access to credit. 
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5.3.4  Trade promotion and export development of SMEs/private enterprises 
 
The government has applied a relaxed policy on restricting imports and exports and, 
as a result, the growth in the value of exports and imports from 1992 has increased 
rapidly. During the period 1992-1999 the value of exports and imports has increased 
more than four times. However, the number of trade licenses given to enterprises in 
the private sector only accounts for 15-20 percent of the total number of trade licenses 
(Figures from Ministry of Trade, 1998). A number of general trade restrictions 
remain. Non-state enterprises are allowed to export commodities produced by them 
and can import the input factors necessary to their production. However, they have to 
get permission from the Prime Minister if they want to participate in other export and 
import activities. At the beginning of 1997 regulations limiting licences on exported 
commodities were abandoned. In addition, access to domestic and international 
markets for some valuable trade items is severely restricted. Licences to trade in rice, 
petroleum, fertiliser, black cement, cars, and motorcycles are only given to a few 
favoured enterprises. Only 19 enterprises are allowed to export rice and 25 enterprises 
are allowed to import fertiliser. Abandoning these regulations would greatly increase 
trading opportunities.  
 
In addition to requiring export or import licenses, the Ministry of Trade still has the 
right to require specific additional licenses related to certain groups of exported or 
imported commodities. Furthermore, for some commodities additional export or 
import licenses must be obtained from the line ministries. The tariff system also 
remains extremely complicated with many tariff lines, and nominal rates are high and 
the range of tariff rates is excessively wide. The system of tariff codes is not 
compatible with the system of product codes. 
 
While trade procedures have gradually improved a number of problems remain. 
Institutional support for trade is still not available. Effective measures to prevent a 
large inflow of smuggled goods are not available. Some policy measures, such as the 
90/CP or 91/CP decrees, which established the state-owned general corporations, and 
the special preferential treatment to SOEs though the credit and trade policies, are 
disadvantaging SMEs in the private sector. 
 
More recently, the promulgation of three new implementing Decrees related to the 
New Enterprise Law in 2000, and the removal of some quantitative restrictions in 
import management, represent a significant step forward in improving the trade and 
business environment for private sector development and SME support in Vietnam. 
Export licensing and trade management by quota is becoming less important than in 
the past. However some of the quotas now accessible to private enterprises need to be 
further opened up, and the bidding system should be more transparent. Also, special 
attention should be directed at the proper implementation of the new decrees, 
regulations and instructions of the Government. 
 
At present, the major obstacle preventing SMEs from seizing trade opportunities is 
their limited experience of global trade. Fragmentary knowledge and understanding of 
foreign markets are some of the b asic trade barriers. This applies not only for 
information about management accounting, technical requirements, marketing skills, 
import regulations and consumer preferences, but also for assessing the suitability of 
imported goods. Limited language skills of the entrepreneurs are also a problem. Lack  
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of these fundamental skills could be a severe problem when Vietnam further 
integrates into the global economy in the coming years. 
 
Overcoming these difficulties requires not only an extended exposure of Vietnamese 
entrepreneurs to the world market, but also an intensive teaching and training of 
SMEs. Tapping into the expertise existing in neighbouring and other foreign countries 
would be particularly beneficial. 
 
Beyond the information gap, the low level of competitiveness and the restricted ability 
to produce larger numbers of identical items of similar quality and on time are other 
severe trade barriers for local SMEs. Therefore, tailor-made quality management 
systems have to be propagated and implemented in order to enhance SMEs export 
opportunities. 
 
5.3.5  Image of the private sector 
 
The image of the private sector has to be improved in the country. The vital role of 
private companies for employment generation and modernisation of Vietnam should 
be acknowledged and disseminated through the media and the educational system at 
all levels. Negative social and administrative attitudes towards private enterprises 
impact adversely upon behaviour towards those engaged in private activities. They 
influence individual’s decisions to enter the private sector and, once entered, constrain 
their ability to unleash their full potential. Growing one’s business and increasing its 
visibility through success is seen as a risky proposition by many entrepreneurs in 
Vietnam, because private business has tended to be viewed negatively. 
 
With greater freedom for the private sector also comes the need for improved 
corporate governance. There are at least three problems of corporate governance that 
will need to be addressed if the private sector is to grow in a transparent, accountable 
and effective manner. First, a key characteristic of the private SMEs is that their 
organisations are quite opaque. Not only is the ownership-structure of most of these 
SMEs not known but also the way decisions are made is unclear. This is not much of 
a problem when firms are small, but as they become bigger and owner-managers’ 
span of control is less adequate, absence of appropriate decision-making processes 
will constrain their growth. Second, most SMEs now do not maintain sufficient 
accounts or make any public disclosure of their accounts. Various types of restrictions 
and insufficient social acceptance of business success leads SMEs to misreport 
financial and other flows, when reporting is required. In the coming decade, it will be 
necessary to put in place the framework that will ensure that such enterprises act in a 
transparent and accountable manner. 
  
6.  Implementing an effective Competition Policy 
 
From the earlier sections of this paper it is apparent that if Vietnam is to move 
forward to become a more market-oriented economy, the implementation of an 
effective competition policy is essential. There are a number of key ingredients. 
Firstly there is a need for ongoing ownership reform, and the generation of growth of 
new private enterprises. This requires a removal of barriers to new business so that 
entry into markets for all forms of ownership is free. In this regard encouragement to 
the growth of SMEs in industry, agriculture and transport, and especially in services  
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where the greatest deficiency previously existed. This adds to economic activity, 
greater competition and efficiency in existing markets, and the development of new 
products and markets. Ownership reform can be seen as an evolutionary process in 
which the state and private sectors exist permanently side by side. The relative size of 
the private sector steadily increasing through time due to: the entry of new private 
firms; through the sale of certain state property rights at fair prices: and through the 
liquidation of inefficient state owned enterprises that prove to be unviable. All these 
three processes should be encouraged but not forced, allowing scope for 
experimentation and trials of various forms of ownership reform. 
 
Secondly, encouragement should be given to foreign capital investment in the 
country. This not only alleviates the acute shortage of capital but also paves the way 
for attaining new technologies, adopting modern management methods, enhancing the 
skills of domestic workers, and gaining access to foreign markets. Foreign capital 
should not be encouraged to go into certain markets and not into others. Traditionally 
in Vietnam foreign capital was encouraged to go into import substituting sectors, were 
more capital intensive and their production aimed at satisfying domestic demand. As a 
result such investment did not focus upon those sectors of the economy where the 
country’s comparative advantage lies, that is in the production of export oriented 
labour intensive manufactured  goods. Restrictions on foreign sector investment, 
therefore, should be eliminated.  
 
Thirdly, unviable state owned enterprises should be allowed to exit the market, and 
their resources put to more efficient and productive uses elsewhere in the economy. 
This will require exit mechanisms such as the introduction of bankruptcy and 
liquidation procedures. This is also an important component in the process of 
ownership reform, requiring greater involvement by the private sector in their 
ownership and management  including in the form of privatisation (equitisation). 
Remaining state owned enterprises should be subject to hard budget constraints. 
 
Finally, a level playing field in terms of access to markets and fair competition 
between the various forms of ownership needs to be created. Public ownership should 
not be forced out where it is capable of standing up to market competition, while there 
should be no discrimination against private ownership. The state as a buyer should not 
make public procurement decisions based on the form of ownership of the seller, 
instead purchases should be made on the basis of which seller offers the best price and 
conditions. 
 
7.  Summary and conclusions 
 
Ongoing reform in Vietnam will require the revitalisation and equitisation 
(privatisation) of the country’s many unprofitable SOEs, the development of a robust 
and dynamic private sector, as well as a further opening of the economy to foreign 
investment, competition, and trade. This reform, in the short term, runs the danger of 
increased unemployment and rising poverty, and potential social unrest that the 
authorities would wish to avoid. Such instability could be avoided if reform proceeds 
slowly, but would likely contribute to a stagnating economy that would fall further 
behind its already reforming regional neighbours. Hence the authorities face difficult 
choices. This paper has argued that the role of SMEs, particularly in the private sector, 
have the potential to play a crucial role in the future development of the economy by:  
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harnessing latent entrepreneurial zeal; creating new jobs for those made unemployed 
by a restructuring of state enterprises, and for those living in the countryside; bringing 
about a more efficient allocation of resources in line with the country’s comparative 
advantage; expanding exports; bringing about a more equitable distribution of 
income; alleviating poverty in the rural sector; and promoting regional development. 
To date their contribution to the economy remains below what it could be, as 
demonstrated by the experiences of its regional neighbours. Hence greater emphasis 
needs to be placed upon their development.   
 
A World Bank report observed that allowing farmers greater freedom of decision-
making after the introduction of Doi Moi in 1986 made possible the agricultural 
growth that was “the main engine for Vietnam’s first great wave of growth” (World 
Bank, 1998, p.30). It recommended that “unshackling SMEs from existing restrictions 
could unleash a second round of growth by boosting labour-intensive manufactures 
and processed agricultural exports, thereby protecting rural areas from the current 
slowdown” (ibid.). To date, however, private SMEs (that is registered private firms, 
have, according to the Bank, “played a minor role in industrial production, 
contributing only two percent of industrial output and have grown very slowly. 
Household enterprises play a much larger role” (ibid.). 
 
The most cost-effective way of generating non-agricultural employment in Vietnam, 
according to a World Bank Consultative Group, is through promoting SMEs, that is 
registered private companies with between 50 and 300 employees (World Bank, 1998, 
p.29). Each job generated in an SME is estimated to require a capital investment of 
about US$800, compared with an investment of US$18,000 in a State Owned 
Enterprise (SOE) ( op.cit. pp. 29-30). This conforms, says the Bank, to empirical 
evidence from other countries indicating that SMEs are more efficient users of capital 
under most conditions. 
 
In line with this evidence the Government has stated that it will support the 
development of SMEs through favourable policies and assistance in finance, market 
information and staff training (specified in a draft strategy to develop SMEs in 
Vietnam to 2010 prepared by the MPI). To support SMEs, the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry is working with relevant agencies, including the MPI, on the 
establishment of a credit guarantee system.  It is clear that further government support 
is needed to help SMEs develop. It will be necessary to offer additional tax incentives, 
and support in funds and floor space to develop production, as well as to devise 
reasonable financial policies to attract money from the public and encourage effective 
investment by the private sector. Priority for enterprises will need to be given to trade 
categories focused upon traditional trades, handicraft, consumer goods, exports and 
hi-tech products. In addition, the State needs to reform the way it manages SMEs, so 
that procedures can be simplified and made easier to implement. SME development in 
the rural sector to expand employment and reduce poverty should also be given 
priority.  
 
If the changes in policy identified in this chapter address the four key areas of: 
enhancing the legal environment for SMEs; strengthening existing and developing 
new institutions; enable easier access to finance; trade promotion and export 
development; and improving the image of, and attitudes to, the private sector as well 
as its corporate governance, then the optimistic growth of the private sector outlined  
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in the SEDS can be achieved. In addition, the implementation of a competition policy 
that focuses upon ownership reform and the elimination of market barriers to entry, 
encourages foreign investment, enables the closure of unviable enterprises, and puts 
all forms of ownership on an equal basis, will be an essential pre-requisite for the 
growth of the private sector and a return to high and sustainable growth. As China, 
another transition economy, has demonstrated, private firms, if given the r ight 
environment, can grow rapidly, from 100,000 to 1 million in number in just 6 years 
and make a major contribution to the economy. In the case of China, however, there is 
clear commitment from the government to bring about this structural transformation, 
while for Vietnam there is still the perception that the authorities are dragging their 
feet.  
 
Despite the capital-intensive nature of much of Vietnam’s growth, there have been 
encouraging signs in the last few years of the emergence of a labour-intensive export 
sector. Changes in trade policies have been an essential component of the doi moi 
policy adopted since 1986. Licensed private companies are now allowed to engage 
directly in international trade, breaking the trade monopoly of a small number of state 
owned enterprises operating under central or provincial authorities. However, until 
very recently, private enterprises had to satisfy a number of fairly restrictive 
conditions to obtain the necessary licenses. The recent removal of trade licensing, 
allowing companies to freely engage in trade within the registered scope of their 
business activities, should further improve the environment for export oriented 
industries. In addition, over the years, most export quotas have been lifted and export 
taxes have been reduced to generally very low levels. These reforms, together with 
sound macroeconomic management, have allowed Vietnam to exploit its comparative 
advantage in labour intensive manufactures, putting the country on track for export 
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